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Deliberation and Decision-Making Process
in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Do Individual Opinions Matter?1*
Ranieri Lima Resende2†

The work is focused on the adjudicatory nature of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and investigates its model of deliberation, considering
three basic schemes: per curiam, seriatim and hybrid. In order to identify an
institutional pattern, the importance of individual opinions is analyzed through
the quantitative performance of each category of judge (ad hoc and regular),
as well as each type of adjudicative activity (judgments and advisory opinions).
The quantitative data is also useful to better understand the explicit assimilation
of separate opinions to the core reasoning of future cases. As a result, it has
been possible to identify relevant aspects applicable to the main problem of
whether individual opinions really matter to the Inter-American Court’s
decision-making process.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem addressed in this article was born from some general issues
connected to the institutional behavior of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Inter-American Court), such as the deliberative pattern adopted by the
Court, the decision-making process developed throughout the Court’s practice,
and the repercussion of the judges’ individual opinions regarding the reasoning
of the Inter-American judgments.3
In summary, concurrent and divergent opinions have one essential
characteristic centered in the reasoning that represents the individual views of
their authors (judges or arbitrators) as distinct from those of the Court as a
whole.4
Due to their profuse number, separate opinions have been used by actors
of the Inter-American System and the Court itself, as demonstrated by the
following situations:
i) the request for interpretation of an individual opinion related to the
Quispialaya Vilcapoma case by the Peruvian State, which was
refused by the Court based on the argument that separate
opinions shall not be the object of this remedy.5 Prima facie, the
logical conclusion would be the exclusion of the individual
opinions from the Court’s reasoning, in spite of the condemned
State’s contrary understanding;
ii) the use of individual opinions as the Court’s reasoning in several
briefs by demanding States, e.g. the preliminary exception of
3

For this paper, I have adopted the term “Separate Opinion” as synonym of “Individual
Opinion” and, to differentiate the respective conclusion according to the collegiate body’s
position, I assumed the terms “Concurrent Opinion” and “Dissenting Opinion” (or “Divergent
Opinion”).
4
See Farrokh Jhabvala, The Scope of Individual Opinions in the World Court, 13 NETH. Y.B.
INT’L L. 33, 47 (1982).
5
Quispialaya Vilcapoma v. Peru, Interpretation, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 320,
¶ 25 (Nov. 21, 2016).
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competence presented by Guatemalan State in the Members of
the Village of Chichupac case6 (separate opinion of Judge García
Sayán in the case of the Massacres of El Mozote), and the final
arguments presented by the Venezuelan State in the Ríos et al.
case7 (separate opinion of Judge García Ramírez in the case of
the Miguel Castro Castro Prison);
iii) the explicit quotation of separate opinions in the quality of judicial
reasoning by the Court itself, as shown by the judgment in the
cases of Baena Ricardo et al.8 (individual opinion of Judge
Cançado Trindade in the Advisory Opinion OC-18/03), and
Castañeda Gutman9 (individual opinion of Judge Piza Escalante
in the Advisory Opinion OC-7/85).
In principle, identifying such a large amount of individual opinions and their
argumentative use could intuitively support the perception that the InterAmerican Court’s decision-making process is outlined by aggregating the
content of separate opinions regarding past judgments. In order to confirm or
refute this perception, a quantitative analysis may produce interesting results for
gauging the impact of separate opinions of some judges in comparison to others.
In the first part of this paper, I analyze the adjudicative nature of the
Inter-American Court’s institutional activity in order to identify the theoretical
models of deliberation and one in which the Court’s deliberative pattern may fit
in.
Next, I attempt to better understand the role of ad hoc judges in the InterAmerican Court as a possible deviation from impartiality and independence in
judgments, because of their direct national connection with the respondent
States.
Based on these assumptions, I search for patterns of production of
individual opinions in judgments (June 1987 – Aug. 2017) and advisory
opinions (Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017) as available at the Court’s website, in order
to identify whether or not the separate opinions were well-distributed among a
large number of judges, as an institutional characteristic, or concentrated within
a small group, which may reveal personal tendencies.
At last, I focus on the analysis of separate opinions quoted by the InterAmerican Court at the core reasoning of its subsequent judgments and advisory
opinions, which have generated some unexpected results.

6

Members of the Village of Chichupac and Neighboring Communities of the Municipality of
Rabinal v. Guatemala, Main Briefs, “Preliminary Exception of Competence and Merits
Arguments of the Guatemalan State”, ¶¶ 87-102 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/aldea_chichupac_gt/contest.pdf.
7
Ríos et al. v. Venezuela, Main Briefs, “Final Arguments of the Venezuelan State”, ¶ 3, & n.1
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/luisiana/alefest.pdf.
8
Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 104, ¶ 102 n.70
(Nov. 28, 2003).
9
Castañeda Gutman v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparation, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 159 n.55 (Aug. 6, 2008).
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I.

INTER-AMERICAN COURT: AN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIVE
INSTITUTION
According to Jeremy Waldron,10 within a constitutional system based on
the separation of powers, the distribution of State functions among different
political structures (or institutions) seems to be the keystone of the constitutional
theory itself. As a result, the dignity of legislation, the independence of courts
and the authority of the executive, exercised by fundamentally distinct entities
and persons, tend to generate, in principle, a political environment that is
refractory to tyranny and abuse of power.11
In my previous work, which analyzed the structure of the World Trade
Organization (WTO),12 I adopted the Armin von Bogdandy’s model of division
of functions within that international institution.13 This model postulates:14
i) an executive function, centered on the attributions of application,
management and operation of multilateral and plurilateral
agreements;
ii) a legislative function, focused on the members’ negotiation forum;
and
iii) an adjudicative function, centered on the dispute resolution system.
One point deserves special attention regarding the executive function:
the absence of a central organ within the Inter-American System, which is
similar to the structure of the WTO. Unlike the model adopted by some
international organizations (e.g.: International Monetary Fund, World Bank),
the WTO does not have an executive collegiate body formed by a strict group
of Members to expedite deliberative and decision-making processes.15 The level
of decentralization of the System seems even higher when analyzed the role of
the Organization of American States (OAS) and its organs, especially the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights,16 and the diffuse participation of the
Member States.

10

JEREMY WALDRON, Separation of Power and the Rule of Law, in POLITICAL POLITICAL
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 45, 46-50 (2016).
11
See generally M. DE MONTESQUIEU, Of the Constitution of England, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 198 (1777) (discussing the dangers of
legislative and executive powers vested in one person or one group of people); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47 (James Madison) (elucidating the tyrannical dangers of accumulated power in one person
or one group of people).
12
RANIERI LIMA RESENDE, A Estrutura Orgȃnica e Funcional da OMC, in O REGIME JURÍDICO
DA RESPONSABILIDADE DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS: CONTRIBUIÇÕES À ANÁLISE DE
SUA APLICABILIDADE À ORGANIZAÇÃO MUNDIAL DO COMÉRCIO 87 (2010).
13
Id. at 88-89.
14
Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient
Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 609, 614-17 (2001).
15
See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE AND WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 132-34 (4th ed. 2017); MARY E.
FOOTER, AN INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 38 (2006).
16
Organization of American States, Charter (A-41), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_
american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp (“Article 106. There shall be an Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall be to promote the observance
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On the other hand, the legislative function is exercised by the fora of the
States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights and the Member
States of the OAS, who negotiate treaties and produce international normative
acts applicable to the whole Inter-American System.
Inspired by this paradigm and considering the institutional design of the
Inter-American System of Human Rights, it is possible to see that the InterAmerican Court has developed an adjudicative function per excellence.17
Through its jurisdiction over litigant matters, the Court produces international
rulings to resolve disputes based on obligations mandated by the American
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica, 1969) in cases of
violation of human rights.18 In this sense, the Court only judges the behavior of
States Parties which have expressly accepted its jurisdiction.
As well criticized by José E. Alvarez,19 the classic, old-fashioned
prototype of adjudication in international law involved strict elements:
independent judges, relatively precise and pre-existing legal norms, adversary
proceedings, and a dichotomous decision in which one of the parties should
prevail. According to this formal perspective, the production of advisory
opinions would not be part of the adjudicatory activity.
Nevertheless, inspired by Henry J. Steiner’s work,20 Alvarez
understands that it is possible to include the human rights regional court’s
consultative function within the sphere of adjudication,21 based on the legal
effects of advisory opinions beyond the boundaries of a single dispute, in order
to promote dialogues on human rights norms between international and national

and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these
matters.”).
17
See ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, EL EJERCICIO DE LA FUNCIÓN JUDICIAL
INTERNACIONAL: MEMORIAS DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 57-72
(2011); see also Thomas Buergenthal, Implementation of the Judgments of the Court, in
MEMORIA DEL SEMINARIO “EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI” 185, 186-91 (2d ed. 2003).
18
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S.
No.
36,
1144
U.N.T.S.
123,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm (“Article 63. 1. If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that
the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also
rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach
of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 2.
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has
under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the
request of the Commission”).
19
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 521-26 (2005).
20
Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the
Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 15
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
21
See ALVAREZ, supra note 19, at 540, 545, 558; see also José E. Alvarez, What are
International Judges for? The Main Function of International Adjudication, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 159, 168-70 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds.,
2014).
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branches and, simultaneously, to decide in advance a number of future probable
cases.22
A good example of this phenomenon may be identified in the advisory
opinion of Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for
the Practice of Journalism (1985),23 whose reasoning was adopted by some
national constitutional and supreme courts in Latin America.24 This advisory
opinion forbade internationally illicit prerequisites applicable to journalists and
safeguarded the freedom of expression. As a consequence of the adoption of
this opinion by some national courts, several cases were not submitted before
the Inter-American System.
In this sense, the adjudicatory activity of the Inter-American Court
seems to encompass the resolution of cases as well as the production of advisory
opinions.
Although the Pact of San José is the fundamental treaty of the InterAmerican System, its substantive and procedural norms have undergone an
evident process of expansion. From a formal perspective, the American
Convention and the OAS Charter are the strong core of the protective
mechanism, but, from a material point of view, the system’s normative base
shows highly dynamic characteristics.
As registered in specialized legal literature,25 examples of such
expansion can be found in the express references by the Inter-American Court
to the Protocol of San Salvador (1988)26 and the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994)27, and likewise other regional treaties
in which the Court assumes its implicit interpretive capacity, such as the Inter-

22

Hélène Tigroudja, La Compétence Consultative de la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de
L’Homme, in LA FONCTION CONSULTATIVE DES JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES 1, 16-21
(Alain Ondoua & David Szymczak eds., 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1720423.
23
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism
(Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5 (Nov. 13, 1985).
24
See, e.g., Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing
Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297, 351-52
(1995); Jaime Córdoba Triviño, Aplicación de la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos al Derecho Constitucional Colombiano, ANUARIO DE DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 667, 670-71, 680 (2007); André de Carvalho Ramos,
Supremo Tribunal Federal Brasileiro e o Controle de Convencionalidade: Levando a Sério os
Tratados de Direitos Humanos, 104 REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE
DE SÃO PAULO 241, 261-64 (2009).
25
Accord, e.g., CECILIA MEDINA, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: CRUCIAL
RIGHTS AND THEIR THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-4 (2d ed. 2016); Gerald L. Neuman, Import,
Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 101, 107-08 (2008).
26
Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html.
27
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons, Jun. 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. No. 80, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-60.
html.
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American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985)28 and the
Convention of Belém do Pará (1994)29. There are also international legal
standards which cannot be classified as treaties but they are part of the named
Inter-American Corpus Juris, such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter
approved by the OAS General Assembly (2001)30 and the OAS Resolution on
Access to Public Information (2006).31
Considering this, we should pay special attention to Article 64 of the
American Convention,32 according to which the Inter-American Court may
exercise its consultative jurisdiction for the institutional interpretation of any
global or regional human rights treaty applicable to the American Continent, if
the treaty has been ratified by at least one OAS Member.33
Another important aspect is the Court’s competence for monitoring the
compliance with its own judgments and, in the hypothesis of persistent nonimplementation by the recalcitrant State, the Tribunal may report the situation
before the OAS General Assembly34 for collective deliberation and application
of institutional measures. In spite of this abstract design, the Court’s
institutional practice in compliance procedure has revealed a more diffuse,

28

Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-51.html.
29
Inter-American Convention on Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women, Jun. 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-61.html.
30
Organization of American States, General Assembly Res., Inter-American Democratic
Charter, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.oas.
org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm.
31
Organization of American States, General Assembly Res. 2252, Access to Public
Information: Strengthening Democracy, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.2252 (XXXVI-O/06)
(June 6, 2006), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/AG03341E09.pdf.
32
American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 64. 1. The member states of the Organization
may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of
competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American
States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court. 2.
The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that state with
opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international
instruments”).
33
See, e.g., Tigroudja, supra note 22, at 4-7; JORGE ERNESTO ROA ROA, LA FUNCIÓN
CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 34-39 (2015). Cf.
“Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1,
¶¶ 35-42 (Sept. 24, 1982).
34
American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 65. To each regular session of the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States the Court shall submit, for the Assembly's
consideration, a report on its work during the previous year. It shall specify, in particular, the
cases in which a state has not complied with its judgments, making any pertinent
recommendations”).
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symbolic role35 which reinforces the conclusion that the political balance
applicable to non-compliance issues has not produced effective results overall.36
In this sense, the structural characteristic of diffusion permeates the
Inter-American System through the complex interactions between institutional,
procedural and normative aspects, far from the simplistic perspective of solely
two participating organs (namely, Inter-American Commission and Court).37
Based on the specific adjudicatory function exercised by the InterAmerican Court in the production of international rulings, it is important to
identify the deliberative model adopted and, in connection, investigate the
weight of the judges’ individual opinions within the Court’s practice.
II. DELIBERATION AND DECISION
After rich academic debate on this article’s initial draft, the best option
has been to concentrate the analysis on the formation of the Inter-American
Court’s judgments, especially through the verification of its deliberative
practice, which includes the identification of the ratio decidendi in the Court’s
reasoning. A quantitative analysis option aims to map relevant decisional
patterns in the judicial practice, particularly regarding the explicit importance
of individual opinions for future cases.38
These aspects, which appear simple at first sight, expose relevant
typologies of the judicial deliberative process that are clearly distinct from the
final decision-making moment and result.
Despite the fact that the two categories reflect a wider spectrum of the
decision-making process (lato sensu), it is fundamental to distinguish
“deliberation” from “decision” (stricto sensu). Seen from a temporal
perspective, deliberation is a prerequisite to the conclusive moment, and it can
be understood as a necessary interstice within the democratic decision-making
process, in which an exchange of arguments, communicating discourse and
rational persuasion take place.39
The distinctive schemes of deliberation and decision have their roots in
the example extracted from the Homeric tradition and quoted by Aristotle.
According to his Nicomachean Ethics,40 the kings announced their choices to
35

See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s
Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 518-19 (2011). Cf. James L.
Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in TwentyFirst Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 824-25 (2008).
36
Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 438, 449-51 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 2014).
37
Cf. Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 382-87
(2008); but cf. Dinah Shelton, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 208-19 (2d
ed. 2005).
38
It is important to register that this specific research does not aim to analyze the external
repercussions of separate opinions, for instance, before constitutional or supreme courts of the
States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, neither focus on their implicit
influence on subsequent judgments of the Inter-American Court itself.
39
Cícero Araújo, Razão Pública, Bem Comum e Decisão Democrática, in PARTICIPAÇÃO E
DELIBERAÇÃO: TEORIA DEMOCRÁTICA E EXPERIÊNCIAS INSTITUCIONAIS NO BRASIL
CONTEMPORÂNEO 157 (Marcos Nobre & Vera Schattan P. Coelho eds., 2004).
40
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 43-45 (David Ross transl., 2009).
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the people after prior deliberation. This reveals the judgment to be a direct result
of the deliberative interstice and centered in the definition not of ends, but of
means.
The capacity to engage in rational action might originate in the
foundations of the deliberative process,41 in order to allow effective
communication among persons involved in the decision-making process.
In a democratic environment, the primordial commitment is to adopt
decisions in the public sphere after effective public deliberations, during which
access to the deliberative forum should be free for all. This would mean every
citizen must have the capacity to convince and be convinced by good reasons.
On the other hand, all citizens have an obligation to accept the deliberative
choice about a public action adopted by the majority.42
Obviously, the typical deliberative process before judicial organs does
not allow the same open participation to all citizens or their Parliamentary
representatives, as part of deciding each case under judgment. However, given
that the courts are collegiate institutions, where reasons are generated through
an internal process of deliberation and guided by applicable norms and based
on democratic premises, the underlying reasons must become public.43
Some difficulties seem to arise from the applicability of the democratic
concept to non-state institutions, such as international organizations and courts,
due to the strong limitations to a broad implementation of the majoritarian
premise in international arena. Nevertheless, the idea of cosmopolitan
citizenship derived from the Kantian perspective may provide an interesting
theoretical support,44 especially when visualized the main role of the European
and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights in protecting individuals and
minorities against violations performed by public authorities.
Through an interesting criticism against the Robert A. Dahl’s conception
of bureaucratic bargaining system applicable to international organizations,
which are characterized as non-democratic institutions,45 James Tobin points
out that the unrestricted majority rule could be disastrous for minorities, for
equality of citizens (or members) before the law, and for the democratic
continuity itself.46
Even if the democratic nature of international organizations cannot be
unequivocally assumed, as may demonstrate the role and practice of the UN

41

See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND
PRACTICAL REASON 139-40 (2009).
42
John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, 42 NOMOS 75, 79 (2000).
43
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative Institutions:
Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST
AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21, 22-25 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2003).
44
Armin von Bogdandy, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts: A Conceptual
Framework, 14 THEOR. INQ. L. 361, 364-67 (2013).
45
Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 19, 34 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds.,
1999).
46
James Tobin, A Comment on Dahl’s Skepticism, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 37,
38 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999).
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Security Council, for instance,47 there are undeniable, structural elements of
democratic deliberation within international courts’ decision-making and
procedure, such as formal, objective justifications for the adjudicatory activity,
and the compliance with due process standards based on the rules of the court.48
Given the fundamental distinction between deliberation and decision
also applicable to international courts, it is important to identify which
deliberative model seems more adequate to describe the dynamics of the InterAmerican Court.
III. GENERAL DELIBERATIVE MODELS: ELEMENTARY DISTINCTIONS
Meanwhile, there is an interesting variable relevant to legal research on
the types of deliberative performances within the decision-making process, i.e.
the dynamic distance between per curiam and seriatim models.
According to the long-established English and American judicial
tradition, there are three basic schemes of collegiate court deliberation:49
i) per curiam model: characterized by externalization of the unified
opinion of the court without publicity of the judges’ individual
opinions;
ii) seriatim model: when each judge’s judgment is publicly presented
one at a time, as an individual opinion, to be used in composing
a possible myriad of reasonings that might contain the opinion
of the court;
iii) hybrid model: centered on externalization of the court’s majority
opinion, which has synthesized the institutional position, but at
the same time, the judges may express their concurrent or
divergent individual opinions.
The initial phase of judicial reasoning in a per curiam deliberative
environment would be quite imperceptible to the general public, as the final,
explicit product of the deliberation appears as the unified court’s opinion. Based
on this model, the problem of the topographic location of a precedent, for
instance, is easily solved by the concentrated factual and legal reasoning
adopted unanimously or by the majority.50
A historic demonstration of the per curiam scheme can be identified in
the arbitral deliberative model promoted by the Hague system of dispute
resolution, based on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. According to the
47

See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 506,
518-27 (1995).
48
See MAX GOUNELLE, LA MOTIVATION DES ACTES JURIDIQUES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC: CONTRIBUTION A UNE THEORIE DE L’ACTE JURIDIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
28, 97 (1979).
49
M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 1,
8 (363 JOHN M. OLIN PROGRAM IN LAW & ECON. WORKING PAPER, 2007),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1217&context=law_and_eco
nomics. See also Virgílio Afonso da Silva, Beyond Europe and the United States: The Wide
World of Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 318, 330-34 (Erin F. Delaney &
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2018).
50
José Ribas Vieira & Margarida Lacombe Camargo, A Dificuldade de se Criar Precedentes,
JOTA (Sept. 21, 2015), https://jota.info/artigos/a-dificuldade-de-se-criar-precedentes-21092015.
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first conference, arbitrators had the right to register their dissent in the award,
but without any reasoning, while the last one completely suppressed the
dissenting rule, under the belief that public divergent positions would reveal
national biases of the arbitrators, which could generate difficulties for the
implementation of decisions by national States.51
In an interesting comparative study, Rufino do Vale asserts that secret
deliberation is highly consolidated in the Spanish legal order, especially
regarding constitutional jurisdiction, in order to emphasize the Court’s
collegiality in generating a unique decision for the general public, even when
individual opinions are available (hybrid model).52
To provide another example of the hybrid scheme, Robert S. Summers
analyzes the New York State Court of Appeals, where a typical decision is
preceded by a concentrated majoritarian opinion, followed by diffuse
concurrent opinions and, if any, divergent opinions. In the hypothesis of
unanimity, the unified opinion of the Collegiate is published as one sole
document (if there were no concurrent opinions). In both cases, only the
majoritarian or the unanimous reasoning has sufficient power to generate a
binding precedent.53 Based on this judicial practice, other documents of the
decision cannot attract the ratio decidendi.
On the other hand, one clear example of the seriatim model can be found
in the Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision-making process. Its deliberative
option was reinforced by the creation of Justice TV (TV Justiça) in 2002 and
Justice Radio (Rádio Justiça) in 2004, which simultaneously broadcast plenary
judgments.54 This means that the general public can watch entire live judgments,
displaying an overly public type of deliberation. The formalistic sequence of the
judges’ individual opinions, presented one by one according to the Rules of the
Court, immediately publicizes the judges’ legal reasoning and, after the
publication of the decision, their written considerations become fully available
for all.55
A relevant uncertainty risk permeates precedent formation in courts that
adopt the seriatim model. This is based on judges’ individual autonomy in
presenting their separate opinions and publicly sustaining their persuasive
arguments, as the judgment itself carries nothing more than a sum of
monocratic, isolated decisions. Because of the accumulation of diffuse opinions,
sometimes in a completely inharmonic way, the synthesized opinion of the court

51

See Jhabvala, supra note 4, at 35-38.
ANDRÉ RUFINO DO VALE, LA DELIBERACIÓN EN LOS TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES: UN
ESTUDIO EMPÍRICO DE LAS PRÁCTICAS DELIBERATIVAS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL DE
ESPAÑA Y DEL SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL DE BRASIL 35, 79-80, 95-96 (Laura Criado
Sánchez transl., 2017).
53
Robert S. Summers, Precedent in the United States (New York State), in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 355, 360-61 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers eds., 1997).
54
See Thiago Luis Sombra, Why Should Public Hearings in the Brazilian Supreme Court Be
Understood as an Innovative Democratic Tool in Constitutional Adjudication?, 17 GERMAN
L.J. 657, 668-69 (2016).
55
See VALE, supra note 52, at 134, 174-75; see also Diego Werneck Arguelhes, The Open
Court and its Enemies: Publicity in Judicial Deliberations Reconsidered 24 (Feb. 2018)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
52
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might not appear as clear and precise. In this case, the prospective precedent
would generate similar obscurities and imprecisions.56
Based on the inherently structural nature of the precedent for public
authorities,57 this kind of risk will be detrimental to both external assimilation
of the judicial reasoning and its internal legal repercussion on future cases.
IV. DELIBERATIVE OPTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
AND THE WEIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS
A. Ad Hoc Judges: A Deviation?
Before the analysis the deliberative scheme adopted by the InterAmerican Court, it is necessary to distinguish the categories of ordinary judges
from ad hoc judges according to the rules applicable to international courts.
It is interesting to notice that the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ, 1922-1946) had a specific provision on ad hoc
judges,58 which had caused intense debate in the Advisory Committee of Jurists
responsible for drafting the Statute. After the great powers had refused the
proposal which forbade individuals to judge cases connected to their original
national States,59 the solution found by the Committee in its famous meetings
of 192060 was the extension of the prerogative for all litigant States, through the
faculty of ad hoc judge nomination for cases under the Court’s appreciation.
During these meetings, the members of the Advisory Committee tackled
important issues regarding ad hoc judges, such as the problem of the variable
number of judges in proportion to the number of parties (Loder), 61 the ad hoc
judges’ tendency to express individual opinions dissenting from the majority
(Lapradelle),62 the prohibition of recording dissent opinions applied to the ad
hoc judges as a measure of independence with regard to national pressure
(Lapradelle & Fernandes),63 and the low likelihood of ordinary judges from

56

Lewis A. Kornhauser, Deciding Together, 1 REVISTA ESTUDOS INSTITUCIONAIS 38, 51-52
(2015).
57
NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 6-7 (2008). See MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 157-62 (2008); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare
Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570,
577-78 (2001).
58
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 379, 450
(“Article 31. Judges of the nationality of each of the contesting parties shall retain their right to
sit in the case before the Court. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality
of one of the parties, the other party may choose a person to sit as judge”).
59
Gustavo Luiz von Bahten, The Role of Judges ad hoc on International Permanent Courts: A
Critical Analysis, 8 ARS BONI ET AEQUI 25, 30 (2012).
60
P.C.I.J. Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee,
June 16th - July 24th, with Annexes (1920), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-ofinternational-justice/serie_D/D_proceedings_of_committee_annexes_16june_24july_1920.
pdf.
61
Id. at 534.
62
Id. at 535.
63
Id. at 591-92.
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Asiatic, South-American or “smaller” States which would be compensated by
the ad hoc judges’ nominations (Phillimore)64.
Notwithstanding the prevailing position in the Committee synthetized in
the final text of Article 31 of the PCIJ Statute,65 the consensus on these issues
has not always been achieved by Jurists, and defensible divergences remain.
These topics can be summed in three essential perspectives: the reason
d’être of the ad hoc judge, its functional independence, and its distinction
related to an ordinary (or regular) judge in international adjudicatory
institutions.
First, it is urgent to recognize the immanent deviation from the principle
of judicial independence (nemo iudex in sua causa)66 generated by the
participation of national judges in judgments involving their respective national
States. This originally happened when they were in the position of regular
judges. Therefore, the justifications for the procedural right to nominate ad hoc
judges were centered in the equality argument, in order to compensate this
unbalanced situation inside the international adjudicatory process.
Considering the continuity of the PCIJ Statute’s text after the new
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1946-),67 which absorbed the
previous, consolidated rules, this issue focused on the judicial impartiality
remained as a cogent argument, as pointed out by Fitzmaurice and Guerrero,68
for whom the independence of the ad hoc judges may be affected by their
tendency to voice the point of view defended by the government of their
respective national States.
Despite these criticisms, part of the specialized legal literature sustains
that there is sufficient support to ad hoc judges in the ICJ’s institutional practice,
based on which the negative aspects apparently would not affect the credibility
and independence of the Court.69 On the other hand, even though the
quantitative analysis of the ICJ’s judgments shows a few voting tendencies of
national judges (regular and ad hoc), they are always a small minority, not more
than two in the entire Court.70 Additionally, the ad hoc judges “shall not be

64

Id. at 537, 576.
PCIJ Statute, supra note 58.
66
Iain Scobbie, “Une Heresie en Matiere Judiciarie”? The Role of the Judge ad hoc in the
International Court, 4 LAW & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 421, 428 (2005).
67
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1179.
68
Institut du Droit International, Annexe I: Observations des Membres de la Vingt-deuxième
Commission en Réponse à la Circulaire de M. Max Huber du 18 Juillet 1952, 45 ANNUAIRE DE
L’INSTITUT DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (TOME I) 435, 444-46, 458-59 (1954).
69
Accord, e.g., Pieter Hendrik Kooijmans, Article 31, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1707, 1744-45 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed.
2012); Institut du Droit International, Resolutions Adopted by the Institute at its Session at Aixen-Provence, 22 April – 1 May 1954: Study of the Amendments to Be Made in the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (22nd Committee), 45 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (TOME II) 296, 298 (1954).
70
See Il Ro Suh, Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts, 63 AM. J. INT’L
L. 224, 233-34 (1969).
65
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taken into account for the calculation of the quorum” based on the Rules of the
Court (Article 20.3).71
Under the historical inspiration of the World Court’s model, the InterAmerican System on Human Rights has accepted the ad hoc judges in the
composition of the Court during judgments.72
Theoretically, the participation of ad hoc judges in the Inter-American
Court could possibly explain a high number of separate opinions. According to
the Pact of San José,73 the respondent States have the option of appointing one
ad hoc judge, when there is not a permanent judge of its own nationality in the
collegiate body. In this sense, the natural conclusion would be the moral duty
of the ad hoc judges to present individual opinions in the judgments, even if to
publicly justify their appointments.
Nevertheless, there is no reasonable justification for the ad hoc judges
to participate every case before human rights courts. These cases are based on
the individual procedural initiative against the State, differently from the classic
international adjudication State vis-à-vis State.74
In this sense, the Inter-American Court has changed its understanding
on the subject in the Advisory Opinion OC-20/09 requested by Argentina, when
the Tribunal concluded that the appointment of ad hoc judges is restricted to
contentious cases originated by inter-state communications, but not by
individual petitions.75 Afterwards, the Rules of the Court were adapted to this
new position, stating that the national judge of the respondent State shall not
participate in the hearing and deliberation of individual cases,76 in order to
restore the original solution discussed during the Advisory Committee of
Jurists’ meetings of 1920.77
Therefore, changes in the Court’s rules and practice on ad hoc judges
have intensely impacted the quantitative analyses, including the complete
cessation of occurrences of separate opinions by ad hoc judges after 2011.78

71

Rules of the Court, 2007 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/publications/
acts-and-documents-en.pdf.
72
HÉCTOR FAÚNDEZ LEDESMA, EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS: ASPECTOS INSTITUCIONALES Y PROCESALES 181 (3d ed. 2004).
73
American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 55. […] 3. If among the judges called upon to
hear a case none is a national of any of the States Parties to the case, each of the latter may
appoint an ad hoc judge”).
74
LEDESMA, supra note 72, at 185.
75
Article 55 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-20/09,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 20, ¶ 87 (Sept. 29, 2009).
76
Aida Torres Pérez, La Independencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos
desde una Perspectiva Institucional, in DERECHOS HUMANOS: POSIBILIDADES TEÓRICAS Y
DESAFÍOS PRÁCTICOS 66, 75 (Jorge Contesse et al. eds., 2013).
77
Cf. Bahten, supra note 59.
78
According to the Court’s Internet site, the last separate opinion was registered by ad hoc
Judge Diego Rodríguez Pinzón in the case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Judgment of
March 3, 2011, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_222_ing.pdf.
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B. Legal Tradition of Separate Opinions and the
Inter-American Court’s Early Years

Another aspect that deserves our attention concerns the secrecy inherent
in the deliberative process adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. According to its Statute, the Court “shall deliberate in private” and “its
deliberations shall remain secret”, with exceptions decided by the Collegiate
(Article 24.2).79 Additionally, the Rules of the Court reinforce this procedural
choice when they register that “only the Judges shall take part in the
deliberations”, under the assistance of secretariat members (Article 15.2).80
Nevertheless, the secret deliberative pattern does not mean enclosing the
separate opinion’s content, based on the long-standing tradition of national and
international judicial deliberation.81
Seen from a formal perspective, the legal support for the individual
opinion manifestation is based on the American Convention on Human
Rights,82 the Court’s Statute83 and Rules of Procedure84, which recognized this
procedural right to all Inter-American judges.
Similarly to the legal basis for ad hoc judges, the tradition for the rules
of Court on separate opinions can be found in the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice (1920)85 and, subsequently, in the International Court of
Justice’s Statute itself (1946)86. However, as mentioned above, it is important
to notate that a previous debate had taken place in the Advisory Committee of
Jurists (1920), when a proposal for forbidding the publicity of national judges’
dissenting opinions was overthrown.87
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Organization of American States, General Assembly Res. 448, Statute of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80 (IX-0/79) (Oct. 1979), http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/estatuto.
80
Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/reglamento/nov_
2009_ing.pdf.
81
See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415
(1959).
82
American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 66. […] 2. If the judgment does not represent
in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his
dissenting or separate opinion attached to the judgment”).
83
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Statute, supra note 79 (“Article 24. […] 3. The decisions, judgments and
opinions of the Court shall be delivered in public session, and the parties shall be given written
notification thereof. In addition, the decisions, judgments and opinions shall be published, along
with judges' individual votes and opinions and with such other data or background information
that the Court may deem appropriate”).
84
Rules of Procedure, supra note 80 (“Article 65. […] 2. Any judge who has taken part in the
consideration of a case is entitled to append a separate reasoned opinion to the judgment,
concurrent or dissenting. These opinions shall be submitted within a time limit to be fixed by
the President so that the other judges may take cognizance thereof before notice of the judgment
is served. Said opinions shall only refer to the issues covered in the judgment”).
85
PCIJ Statute, supra note 58 (“Article 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in
part the unanimous opinion of the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate
opinion”).
86
ICJ Statute, supra note 67 (“Article 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part
the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion”).
87
See Jhabvala, supra note 4, at 35-38; see also P.C.I.J. Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra
note 60, at 591-92.
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Historically, the Inter-American Court’s first three official judgments,
dated 1987, seem to take the per curiam model, which is shown by the total
absence of individual opinions.88 However, according to Thomas Buergenthal,
the very first judgment of the Court, the In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al.
case (1981), was a truly contentious case rather than a request for an advisory
opinion,89 whose inadmissibility by the Court revealed strong procedural
failures of the parties. This case was also remarkable because of the first
separate opinion originally presented in the history of the Court (Judge Piza
Escalante).90
Therefore, the definitive option for the hybrid scheme became clear after
the fourth judgment related to the Velásquez Rodríguez case (merits).91 In this
model, the Court generates a consolidated document which represents the
opinion of the Court (unanimous or majority), while judges are allowed to
present separate individual opinions, including joint opinions given by two or
more judges.
Nevertheless, the individual opinions not only performed an exclusive
adjudicatory behavior applicable to judgments, but also to advisory opinions
given by the Court. In this sense, it is urgent to refer to the OC-3/83 (Restrictions
to the Death Penalty),92 which had separate opinions by Judges Carlos Roberto
Reina and Piza Escalante, and OC-4/84 (Proposed Amendments of the
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica),93 which had
individual opinions by Judges Piza Escalante and Thomas Buergenthal.
C. Quantitative Data: Parameters in Judgments and Advisory Opinions
Through a recent search in the Court’s website,94 it was possible to
identify a total of 338 judgments in litigant cases, consisting of preliminary
objections, judgments of merits, joint judgments of preliminary objections and

88

See, e.g., Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1 (June 26, 1987); Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales v. Honduras,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 2 (June 26, 1987); Godínez
Cruz v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 3 (June
26, 1987).
89
Thomas Buergenthal, Remembering the Early Years of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 1 CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & GLOBAL JUST. WORKING PAPER 4, 8 (2005),
https://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/s05buergenthal.pdf.
90
In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., Decision, Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge
Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 101 (Nov. 13, 1981).
91
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July
29, 1988).
92
Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3 (Sept. 8, 1983).
93
Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (Jan. 19, 1984).
94
Advisory Opinions and Decisions and Judgments, Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Jurisprudence Finder, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=es (click
separately on “Advisory Opinions” and “Decisions and Judgments” options in “Type”
dropdown box, summation of queries result in 338). The Spanish version of this material was
used during the search, as not all documents were available in English language.
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merits, and requests for interpretation, including the advisory opinions as part
of the adjudicatory activity.95
In this sense, I have followed these premises:
i) when the same judge has presented more than one documented
opinion on the same judgment or advisory opinion, only one
opinion was counted;
ii) when there were separate opinions shared by more than one judge,
including permanent and ad hoc judges, each judge was counted
as an independent individual opinion;
iii) when the same judge simultaneously presented concurrent and
divergent positions in an individual opinion for the same
judgment, only one dissenting opinion was counted;
iv) the first judgment analyzed was the Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v.
Honduras (preliminary objections), dated June 26, 1987, and the
last one was the Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru (preliminary
objections, merits, reparation and costs), dated August 31, 2017;
v) the first advisory opinion analyzed was the OC-1/82 of September 24,
1982, and the last one was the OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017.
After counting all judgments individually, I identified 153 judgments
which had no individual opinion attached, in contrast to 185 others which had
individual opinions (concurrent or divergent), i.e. about 55% of the Court’s
contentious cases had separate opinions attached to them (Table 1).
TABLE 1
Judgments
With / Without Individual Opinions
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017)
Without Individual Opinions

153 (45.3%)

With Individual Opinions

185 (54.7%)

Total

338

During this data search, I identified some extraordinary occurrences,
such as 4 cases in which 6 individual opinions were attached to a single
judgment.96 This is very interesting as the Court consists of only 7 permanent
judges and, when applicable, 1 ad hoc judge.
At this point, it is appropriate to register the Shabtai Rosenne’s
warning,97 for whom the extensive use of separate opinions in international
courts may fracture the final judicial statement and, eventually, weaken its
external, legal force.
According to quantitative data, a significant difference was founded
between concurrent and divergent separate opinions in both categories of judges
95

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Television) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293 (June 22, 2015);
Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 222 (Mar. 3, 2011); Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 90 (Dec. 6, 2001); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
97
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72, 135 (2004).
96
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(permanent and ad hoc). For a total of 359 separate opinions (documents), there
were only 100 divergent individual opinions, i.e. for each divergent opinion 2.59
concurring separate opinions were identified in judgments (Table 2). Differently
from the previous table, here I counted the number of individual opinions as the
number of documents.98
TABLE 2
Judgments
Separate Opinions by Conclusion (per document)
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017)
Concurrent Opinions

259 (72.1%)

Divergent Opinions

100 (27.9%)

Total

359

Analyzing the percentage of separate opinions related to the consultative
activity of the Inter-American Court, the scenario was slightly different, when I
found 24 advisory opinions in the Court’s history until November 2017 and,
among them, 50% had individual opinions:
TABLE 3
Advisory Opinions
With / Without Individual Opinions
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017)
Without Individual Opinions

12 (50%)

With Individual Opinions

12 (50%)

Total

24

On the other hand, the proportion of concurrent and dissenting
individual opinions in connection with the Court’s consultative function was
resembling to the proportion in contentious cases:99
TABLE 4
Advisory Opinions
Separate Opinions by Conclusion (per document)
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017)
Concurrent Opinions

21 (67.7%)

Divergent Opinions

10 (32.3%)

Total

31

In spite of the quantitative difference between the numbers of judgments
and advisory opinions produced throughout the history of the Court, some of
98

For instance, a single divergent separate opinion document was counted as one occurrence,
even when it had three joint individual opinions (e.g.: the joint partially dissenting opinion of
Judges Ventura Robles, Vio Grossi and Eduardo Ferrer in the case of Mémoli v. Argentina,
Judgment of Aug. 22, 2013, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_265_
ing.pdf).
99
Id.
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these data reveal interesting similarities, which can be used to analyze
adjudicatory patterns. In this sense, the high percentage of concurrent opinions
is a coincident aspect in both categories of adjudicatory manifestations (around
70%).
D. Quantitative Data: Ad Hoc Judges
Opportunely, based on the analysis of all concurrent and divergent
individual opinions registered in 185 judgments (Table 1), one interesting fact
has emerged: the large majority of the separate opinions were made by regular,
not ad hoc judges.
In evaluating the separate opinions presented by each permanent judge,
whether isolated or joined by other judge(s), I found a total of 312 occurrences,
in contrast to only 49 individual opinions presented by ad hoc judges (Table 5).
This means that, throughout the history of the Inter-American Court, about 14%
of the individual opinions were given by ad hoc judges, and about 86% were
produced by permanent ones.100
TABLE 5
Judgments
Individual Opinions by Category of Judges
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017)
Regular Judges

312 (86.4%)

Ad Hoc Judges

49 (13.6%)

Total

361

Based on these data, I considered it necessary to verify whether the
enormous amount of separate opinions is connected to a historical institutional
characteristic, definitive feature in the Inter-American Court, or whether it is
just the result of the personal behavior by a small group of judges, which
artificially increased this number.
Strictly considering the ad hoc category, it is possible to identify an
aspect related to the unbalanced performance of some judges in comparison to
others. Despite individual opinions given by 26 different authors, just 5 ad hoc
judges have issued 20 separate opinions, which means that 20% of the judges
produced about 40% of the occurrences (Table 6).101

100

The counting was based on the “Decisions and Judgments” results presented by the InterAmerican Court’s internet search tool, through individualized verification and reading of the
dispositive sections of each 185 judgments with separate opinions. Here the individual opinion
of each judge was counted as an independent manifestation, even when it was part of joint
opinions (e.g. I counted three individual opinions in the joint dissenting opinion of permanent
Judges Picado Sotela and Aguiar Aranguren, and ad hoc Judge Cançado Trindade, presented in
the case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994, http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_16_ing.pdf).
101
Ad hoc Judges Vidal Ramírez (7), Montiel Argüello (5), Novales Aguirre (3), Roberto F.
Caldas (3) and Cançado Trindade (2).
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TABLE 6
Judgments
Individual Opinions by each Ad Hoc Judge
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017)
Ad Hoc Judges
Individual Opinions
Vidal Ramírez

7 (14.3%)

Montiel Argüello

5 (10.2%)

Novales Aguirre

3 (6.1%)

Roberto F. Caldas

3 (6.1%)

Cançado Trindade

2 (4.1%)

Orihuela Iberico

2 (4.1%)

Julio A. Barberis

2 (4.1%)

Martínez Gálvez

2 (4.1%)

Fogel Pedrozo

2 (4.1%)

Rodríguez Pinzón

2 (4.1%)

García Toma

2 (4.1%)

Pasceri Scaramuzza

2 (4.1%)

Alejandro Espinosa

2 (4.1%)

Larraondo Salguero

1 (2.0%)

Charles N. Brower

1 (2.0%)

Gil Lavedra

1 (2.0%)

Salgado Pesantes

1 (2.0%)

Camacho Paredes

1 (2.0%)

Santistevan de Noriega

1 (2.0%)

Zafra Roldán

1 (2.0%)

Herrador Sandoval

1 (2.0%)

Castellanos Howell

1 (2.0%)

López Medina

1 (2.0%)

Cadena Rámila

1 (2.0%)

Biel-Morales

1 (2.0%)

Mac-Gregor Poisot

1 (2.0%)

Total

49

On the other hand, it was not possible to identify a numerically
extraordinary production of separate opinions by any specific ad hoc judge
during the Inter-American Court’s history, based on the peculiar nature of this
jurisdictional performance designated to decide case by case. According to this
characteristic, the most frequent occurrences were 7 individual opinions by ad
hoc Judge Vidal Ramírez and 5 by Montiel Argüello.
Opportunely, as explained in Section IV.B, changes in the rules and
practice of the Court has caused the complete absence of individual opinions
produced by ad hoc judges in judgments after 2011, which affected their
numbers even further.
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E. Quantitative Data: Regular Judges

Continuing the comparison of judges in the same category, it is clear
that a few permanent judges have produced a high number of separate opinions,
as the following data elucidate.
Based on the Table 7, about 51% of the total number of individual
opinions were given by only 3 regular judges. Therefore, considering 312
separate opinions, 159 individual manifestations were produced by Judges
Cançado Trindade (69), García Ramírez (61) and Vio Grossi (29). Accordingly,
one out of every two opinions presented in judgments during the Court’s history
came from one of these three permanent judges.
TABLE 7
Judgments
Individual Opinions by each Regular Judge
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017)
Regular Judges
Individual Opinions
Cançado Trindade

69 (22.1%)

García Ramírez

61 (19.6%)

Vio Grossi

29 (9.3%)

Mac-Gregor Poisot

23 (7.4%)

Ventura Robles

18 (5.8%)

Medina Quiroga

13 (4.2%)

García-Sayán

13 (4.2%)

Pérez Pérez

13 (4.2%)

Roux Rengifo

12 (3.8%)

Sierra Porto

11 (3.5%)

Roberto F. Caldas

8 (2.6%)

Abreu Burelli

8 (2.6%)

Oliver Jackman

7 (2.2%)

Salgado Pesantes

7 (2.2%)

Pacheco Gómez

4 (1.3%)

Montiel Argüello

4 (1.3%)

Piza Escalante

3 (1.0%)

May Macaulay

3 (1.0%)

Abreu Blondet

2 (0.6%)

Picado Sotela

1 (0.3%)

Aguiar Aranguren

1 (0.3%)

Nieto Navia

1 (0.3%)

Leonardo Franco

1 (0.3%)

Total

312

Apparently, the disproportional distribution and concentration of
individual opinions produced by a few permanent judges is a common
phenomenon which I have also identified in the performance of the InterAmerican Court’s consultative jurisdiction.
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Considering the universe of 17 judges, only 5 (about 30%) were
responsible for about 50% of all individual opinions presented in advisory
opinions (Table 8). These data demonstrate that the observed phenomenon in
the Court’s advisory opinions involved a high concentration of separate
opinions by a small group of judges, even if it was not as high as the
concentration observed in contentious cases.
TABLE 8
Advisory Opinions
Individual Opinions by each Regular Judge
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017)
Regular Judges
Individual Opinions
Piza Escalante

4 (12.5%)

García Ramírez

4 (12.5%)

Cançado Trindade

4 (12.5%)

Thomas Buergenthal

2 (6.3%)

Vio Grossi

2 (6.3%)

Pedro Nikken

2 (6.3%)

Oliver Jackman

2 (6.3%)

Rafael Navia

2 (6.3%)

Sierra Porto

2 (6.3%)

Carlos Roberto Reina

1 (3.1%)

Máximo Cisneros

1 (3.1%)

Pacheco Gómez

1 (3.1%)

Gros Espiell

1 (3.1%)

Salgado Pesantes

1 (3.1%)

Abreu Burelli

1 (3.1%)

Roberto Caldas

1 (3.1%)

Pérez Pérez

1 (3.1%)

Total

32

Another interesting aspect may be gleaned from a coincidence: most
individual opinions both in judgments and advisory opinions were given by the
same three judges, i.e. Judges Cançado Trindade and García Ramírez, followed
by Vio Grossi.
Furthermore, it is important to register that these three judges were reelected for a second term,102 which means a double mandate of 12 years for each
one in the Court. Notwithstanding this fact, there also are eight other regular
judges who have exercised two terms in the Tribunal,103 and these judges have
not given such a disproportionate number of separate opinions.
Even considering the peculiar nature of the consultative function, the
high number of individual opinions connected to the Court’s adjudicatory
activity in its entirety seems to demonstrate the prevalence of personal
102

See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Jueces que Han Integrado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/compos16/juecesordenalfabetico.pdf.
103
Judges Abreu Burelli, Fix-Zamudio, García Sayán, Oliver Jackman, Nieto Navia, Pacheco
Gómez, Salgado Pesantes and Ventura Robles.
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performances in detriment of a well-distributed institutional decision-making
pattern.
F. Separate Opinions as Core Reasoning of Subsequent Cases
In order to check the explicit use of individual opinions by the InterAmerican Court in its core reasoning, one last search was conducted in all 338
judgments and 24 advisory opinions available at the Court’s institutional
website.104
As a result, it was possible to identify only three express quotations of
separate opinions in the Court’s reasoning (judgments and advisory opinions):
TABLE 9
Judgments and Advisory Opinions
Individual Opinions Expressly Cited in Core Reasoning
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017)
Case
Cited Individual Opinion
Quoted Original Thesis
“81. One ought to secure a
follow-up to the endeavours of
greater doctrinal and
Baena Ricardo et al. v. Concurring Opinion of
jurisprudencial development of
Panama, Judgment of
Judge Cançado Trindade
the peremptory norms of
November 28, 2003,
In: Advisory Opinion OC- international law (jus cogens) and
n.70.105
18/03 of September 17,
of the corresponding obligations
2003, ¶ 81.
erga omnes of protection of the
human being, moved above all by
the opinio juris as a manifestation
of the universal juridical
conscience, to the benefit of all
human beings. By means of this
conceptual development one will
advance in the overcoming of the
obstacles of the dogmas of the
past and in the creation of a true
international ordre public based
upon the respect for, and
observance of, human rights
(…)”.106

104

During the data search, we accessed each judgment and individually searched for the
occurrences of the words “voto,” “votos,” “opinión” and “opiniones.” These are adopted by the
Inter-American Court as the Spanish version of “individual opinion” and “separate opinion.”
For each word found, I have read the respective paragraph and footnote looking for explicit
citations of separate opinions used as part of the Court’s fundamental reasoning:
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=es.
105
Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
104, ¶ 102 & n.70 (Nov. 28, 2003).
106
Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Separate Opinion of Judge
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
18, ¶ 81 (Sept. 17, 2003).
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Castañeda Gutman v.
México, Judgment of
August 6, 2008,
n.55.107

Concurring Opinion of
Judge Piza Escalante
In: Advisory Opinion OC7/85 of August 29, 1986, ¶
27.

Río Negro Massacres
v. Guatemala,
Judgment of
September 4, 2012,
n.218.109

Concurring Opinion of
Judge Cançado Trindade
In: Advisory Opinion OC18/03 of September 17,
2003, ¶ 75.

[2019

“27. (…) Some rights,
however, due to their nature or to
the wording of the Convention,
lack this immediate and full
enforceability unless domestic
norms or other complementary
measures grant it, as is the case
for example with political rights
(…) or those of judicial protection
(…). If there are no electoral
codes or laws, voter rolls, political
parties, means of publicity and
transportation, voting centers,
electoral boards, dates and time
periods for the exercise of the
right to vote, this right, by its very
nature, simply can not be
exercised; nor can the right to
judicial protection be exercised
unless there are courts to grant it
and there are procedural standards
that control and make it
possible”.108
“75. In a well-known obiter
dictum in its Judgment in the case
of the Barcelona Traction (…),
the International Court of Justice
determined that there are certain
international obligations erga
omnes, obligations of a State visà-vis the international community
as a whole, which are of the
interest of all the States (…). The
prohibitions mentioned in this
obiter dictum are not exhaustive:
to them new prohibitions are
added (…) precisely for not being
the jus cogens a closed category
(…)”.110

These data admit some preliminary interpretations, such as:
i) in general, the Inter-American Court hardly ever quotes individual
opinions in the core reasoning of its judgments and advisory
opinions (about 0.83%);

107

Castañeda Gutman v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparation, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 159 & n.55 (Aug. 6, 2008).
108
Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1) and 2 American
Convention on Human Rights), Separate Opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Advisory
Opinion OC-7/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 7, ¶ 27 (Aug. 29, 1986).
109
Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparation, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 141 & n.218 (Sept. 4, 2012).
110
Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Separate Opinion of Judge
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
18, ¶ 75 (Sept. 17, 2003).
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ii) the Court has strictly quoted separate opinions originated from its
consultative jurisdiction, not from judgments;
iii) no dissenting opinions were mentioned, only concurrent ones;
iv) one specific individual opinion was cited in two of the three
occurrences, but related to different original parts;
v) the quoted theses were connected to notorious themes of the
International Human Rights Law and the International Law, on
which highly controversial debates in specialized legal literature
had occurred:111 the universal perspective of jus cogens norms,
the effective granting of political rights, and the progressive
nature of erga omnes obligations.
CONCLUSION
Based on this short analysis, it is possible to conclude that the hybrid
deliberative model adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
displays some structural tendencies related to the seriatim scheme. This is
shown by the numerically relevant and inconstant production of individual
opinions verifiable in the adjudicatory activity as a whole (judgments and
advisory opinions).
Nevertheless, the accessible location of the core reasoning of collegiate
deliberation, by majority or unanimity, makes it easy to find the ratio decidendi
as the Court’s institutional position, even when I found a disproportionately
large number of individual opinions in judgments. On the other hand, the Court
had a more balanced rate of separate opinions related to its consultative function
(advisory opinions), but with some similarities with the judgments in regard to
the high level of concurrent opinions.
According to the quantitative data searched, one possible explanation for
the high number of separate opinions can be found in the personal behavior of
a relatively small group of judges, rather than in a well-distributed deliberative
institutional practice. Even when I verified the writing manifestations of ad hoc
judges, a perceptible level of concentration of individual opinions could be
noticed.
Setting aside the rare exceptions related to the incorporation of only two
separate opinions originated from advisory opinions in three different
judgments, the hybrid deliberative scheme in the Inter-American Court tends to
isolate the ratio decidendi from the influence of past individual opinions.
Cogitating the case law’s premise in International Law, the separate opinions
might be considered a relevant source of international legal doctrine, but not as
an explicit part of the Inter-American precedent. In addition, the use of
individual opinions by respondent States in their briefs before the Court may be
understood according to this same doctrinal perspective.

111

Accord, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1421-51
(2007); DAVID ALTMAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE 32-44 (2011); MAURIZIO RAGAZZI,
THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 43-73 (1997); Dire Tladi
(Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (jus
cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 (Feb. 12, 2018), http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/
714.
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As it seems verifiable in the practice of the International Court of
Justice,112 the Inter-American Court resists to adopt expressly separate opinions
(concurring or dissenting) as part of the core reasoning of its judgments. On the
other hand, I must admit that those three exceptional quotations of past
individual opinions identified during the research were an interesting surprise,
especially because of the controversial themes involved (jus cogens norms,
political rights, and erga omnes obligations).
Remembering Rosenne’s concern about the immanent risks of extensive
use of individual opinions in international adjudication,113 perhaps it is time to
evaluate whether or not the atomistic behavior of some judges within the
collegiate body could debilitate the institutional position of the Inter-American
Court, which can possibly affect its public authority before the States Parties to
the American Convention on Human Rights.114

112

See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 191-95 (1996).
Rosenne, supra note 97, at 135.
114
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 225,
274-75 (2017).
113
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